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tional system, confrontation A quarter century after the end of the cold war and the collapse of the USSR relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU) are frozen, in large part as a result of Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and the ensuing economic and political sanctions imposed on Russia by both the EU and the United States. But, the friction between the two sides extends much further than to issues related to Russia's policy toward Ukraine. Over the course of the past decade Russia has increasingly challenged the existing global order to which the member states of the EU have been strongly committed for more than half a century. It has also begun to challenge the Union itself, as well as the democratic institutions upon which the national governments of the EU are based. 1 The focus of most of the other essays in this special issue centers on the foreign policy of the EU and their approach to relations with the Russian Federation. Here, however, the primary questions concern the factors that explain the shifts in Russian policy from the early to mid-1990s, when Russian leaders were committed to joining the international system dominated by the European Union and the United States, to the present confrontation between Russia and the West.
2 Why has the relationship deteriorated as it has? The argument developed to respond to this question will unfold as follows. I will first discuss briefly the essentially unsatisfactory nature of relations, from the Russian perspective, between the Russian Federation and the West in the 1990s and their role in determining the central goals that have driven Russia's evolving sense of identity and ensuing policy since Vladimir Putin came to power at the turn of the century. I will note the aspects of Western policy that seemingly led to the decision in Moscow around 2005 that cooperation with the West on terms of equality was impossible and that Russia should forge ahead to achieve its own objectives, even if that resulted in confrontation with the West. comprise the final substantive section of the article. All of these Russian policies contributed to the growing confrontation in relations between Russia and the EU.
From the Short-lived Honeymoon to the Policy Shift under Putin
During the 1990s, when Russia was attempting to adjust to its new and reduced post-Soviet status and seemed willing to join with the West, Europe and the U.S. generally ignored Russia's interests and expanded their own involvement into what had been the Soviet sphere of domination. This expansionist approach, which included NATO intervention in former Yugoslavia despite strong Russian opposition and growing criticism of political developments in Russia itself, culminated in the middle of the 2000s with the extension of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU into Central Europe and the Baltic region, the EU's commitment to a new Eastern Neighbourhood Policy even further east, and 1 Evidence of this effort can be seen in the recent meddling in the electoral process of some countries in the EU, support for right-wing political movements that are nationalistic and authoritarian in orientation, and similar attacks against the United States. See Schindler (2016) and Browstein (2017) .
2 It is important to note that it is impossible to discuss Russian-EU relations without taking into account the impact of the United States and of US-Russian relations on the former. See Kanet (2012) , pp. 147-177. The current article, in part, builds on this earlier analysis.
Western support for the 'colour revolutions' that deposed Moscow's allies in Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Bishkek and brought to power groups committed to closer ties with the West.
Although Russian policy toward the West began to shift already by the mid-1990s, as the United States and its NATO allies intervened militarily in former Yugoslavia and otherwise ignored or challenged Russian interests 3 , it was not until Vladimir Putin became president -and most clearly, after the Bush Administration's largely unilateral decision to invade Iraq, the expansion of both NATO and the EU eastward, and the challenge of the 'colour revolutions' -that Moscow decided that achieving its priority foreign policy objectives on the basis of cooperation with the West was impossible. The result has been a shifting sense of identity that differentiates Russia from Europe and a growing challenge to the dominant position of the West, both in Central and Eastern Europe and globally, as Russia has pursued the goal of reestablishing its position as the preeminent regional power across Eurasia and as a top global actor.
The Western initiatives that impacted relations with Russia so very strongly had their roots in the 1990s, but expanded with the decisions of the United States to intervene militarily in Iraq as part of the new 'war on terror'. Moscow, as well as several U.S. allies, strongly opposed that policy, which set the stage for a broader deterioration of East-West relations. The second set of developments that more directly impacted Russian relations with the European Union negatively included EU and NATO expansion, the EU's Eastern neighbourhood policy, and EU support for the colour revolutions. Initially, although Russian leaders strongly opposed NATO's expansion eastward, they did not oppose postcommunist states joining the EU in a similar fashion.
By the early 2000s, however, the Russians recognized that EU membership not only would cut into future markets for Russian exports, but was also part of a much more comprehensive economic-political-social approach -part of the European Union's game plan for integrating East European states and societies into the Western order and, thus, undercutting Russian long-term interests in the region. The development of the Eastern Neighbourhood program, which aimed at tying six former Soviet republics closely to the EU, without granting full membership, along with visible support for the political uprisings in several post-Soviet states referred to as the colour revolutions were important factors in the evolving tensions in Russo-EU relations. As viewed in Moscow, these were but barely disguised efforts of Western governments and Western NGO's to shift the political orientation of these countries toward closer ties with the West. 4 As Vladimir Putin has noted much more recently, "We see what tragic consequences the wave of so-called color revolutions led to. For us this is a lesson and a warning. We should do everything necessary so that nothing similar ever happens in Russia" (Korsunskaya, 2014 policy, for it announced that Russia was once again a major international actor and would no longer follow the lead of the West in pursuing its foreign and security policy interests. But, it also indicated that Russia saw itself as a pole in the international system separate from and in conflict with the West. It is at roughly this time that Moscow also began to assert itself rhetorically in response to Western charges that it was corrupting or abandoning democracy (Putin, 2007) . For example, in response to EU and US criticisms of the quality of Russian democracy, the Russians argued that they had their own special form of 'sovereign democracy' that was much stronger on the sover- Georgian president decided to use his new US-built military to force the reintegration of secessionist territories; and economic boycotts and cyberattacks against new EU member states with which Russia was in increasing political disagreement. All of these conflicts had their roots in the West's push eastward and Russia's determination that further
Western encroachment into what Moscow viewed as its legitimate sphere of influence had to be stopped -and reversed.
In the case of the gas wars the issue was the longstanding division over both costs of Russian supplies to Ukraine and Ukrainian transit charges for Russian gas being marketed to Europe. Until the overthrow of the pro-Russian government in Kyiv as a result of the Orange Revolution, this issue had been worked out each year. Now, however, with an EU-friendly government in Ukraine, this issue became one of relative political status of the two countries and resulted in a showdown in which Moscow accepted the costs to its longer term economic relations with the EU for failure to deliver gas supplies that resulted from the complete shutdown of gas flowing to Ukraine that was part of Moscow's goal of showing Ukraine who was the dominant actor in the dispute. Russian military intervention sent a clear message to several audiences -the Georgians, the Ukrainians, and the Americans most clearly -that after more than a decade of verbal opposition to NATO expansion, Russia was now in a position, and willing, to use military means to prevent it, even if this meant a further deterioration in relations with 6 For a discussion of Russian policy in the gas wars see Moulioukova and Kanet (2017), pp. 275-298. both the United States and the countries of Western Europe, including Western sanctions imposed to 'encourage' Russia to reconsider the wisdom of its policy. Thus, during the period of Putin's second term as Russian President and into the Medvedev presidency Russian relations with the European Union and with its major member countries had deteriorated significantly. Russia no longer saw the EU as a largely irrelevant institution around which it was easily able to maneuver. Even though the European Union lacked a unified response to relations with Russia at this time on issues such as energy dependence, overall relations declined significantly. Despite various efforts on both sides, relations did not improve significantly during the four years of the Medvedev presidency. Russian challenges to the EU's claims to moral authority and the charge that the EU pursued a double standard expanded during this period (see Neumann, 2016; Kanet, 2015, pp. 503-522; and Facon, 2008) . Russian-EU relations, even though Medvedev was able to pursue a somewhat more liberal foreign policy (Trenin, 2014) .
The Ukraine Crisis and the Collapse of EU-Russian Relations
In a series of articles published prior to the 2012 presidential elections in Russia, then prime minister and presidential candidate Putin laid out his new foreign policy program which was now focused on "preserving Russia's distinct identity in a highly competitive global environment" (Putin, 2011; . Neighbourhood Policy had to forego any special economic ties with other international institutions, such as Mr. Putin's proposed Eurasian Union. In many respects, closer economic ties to the EU were actually economically disadvantageous to countries like Ukraine which could market its industrial products in the emerging Eurasian Union, but was hardly competitive in industrial production when dealing with the countries of the European Union (Molchanov, 2016, pp. 380-395; Molchanov, 2017, pp. 211-34) .
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Since the EU insisted on an 'all or nothing' approach from those to whom they offered Neighbourhood status, countries such as Ukraine were forced to make a choice between a westward or eastward orientation.
10
Therefore, when Russia began to push its Eurasian integration project, the geopolitical confrontation with the EU escalated. 11 This is important for our understanding of the Russian explanation of their policy in the Ukraine crisis and its impact on overall relations with the European Union. As Foreign Minister Lavrov has stated in repeating the points already made by President Putin, "The EU Eastern Partnership program was also designed to expand the West-controlled geopolitical space to the east…. There is a policy to confront the CIS countries with a hard, absolutely contrived and artificial choice -either you are with the EU or with Russia. It was the use of this approach to Ukraine that pushed that country…to a profound internal political crisis" (Lavrov, 2014) .
After Vladimir Putin resumed the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2012 he moved forcefully to implement plans for the consolidation of the Eurasian Union. In the western portion of former Soviet territory this meant that Russia and the EU were both actively pursuing six states -Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In reality, the competition focused on Armenia and Ukraine and, to a lesser extent Moldova. Russia initiated a major pressure campaign to 'encourage' these countries to opt for EEU membership -from economic and security threats targeted against Armenia, should the latter decline to join the organization, to major loans to 10 The dramatic deterioration of US-Russian relations at this same time also contributed to the general decline of the EU's relations with the EU. For example, U.S. legislation passed in 2012 targeting Russian political leaders associated with President Putin for their presumed role in the death of the Russian civil rights lawyer Sergei Magnitsky received a very hostile response in Moscow. (Seddon and Buckley, 2016) 11 Richard Sakwa maintains that EU policy has consistently attempted to exclude Russian from Europe. See Sakwa (2015b) and Sakwa (2015a). would, instead, join the Eurasian Union (Grytsenko, 2013) 
The Russian Challenge to the European Order
More than three years after the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, of Russian intervention in that crisis, and the introduction of Western sanctions, little has changed in the overall relationship. Russia has proven to be more resilient than many in the West had expected and, despite the collapse in international energy prices and the costs associated with the sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States, the Russian economy appears to be in the process stabilizing, with growth of 1.1 and 1.2 percent predicted for 2017 and 2018 (Nelson, 2017, p. 6) . More important, the sanctions and the ensuing domestic economic problems in Russia have not influenced the political leadership -or the general population, for that matter -to initiate a significant shift in Russian policy. In fact, Russia's assertive policy in Ukraine, as well as more recently in Syria, have become an important part of the Putin regime's strengthening of is political support among a large portion of the population -this is despite the economic malaise already noted as a result of the economic sanctions.
As we have demonstrated throughout this discussion, Russian relations with the EU have declined precipitously since the turn of the century and the commitment under President Putin to reestablish Russia's dominant role in regional and global affairs. Given the Russian political elite's commitment to re-establishing Russia's place as a major global power, as well as its own control over the Russian domestic political system, assertive nationalism by the Russian Federation has become an important instrument in accomplishing both of those objectives. The EU, which a quarter century ago was viewed in Moscow as a benign development, is now seen as a competitor for influence in post-Soviet space and as an impediment to Russia's reestablishing itself as the dominant actor in Eurasia and as a major player in global affairs. This competition lay at the root of the confrontation that exploded in Ukraine in 2013-14 and that continues to sour relations four years later.
Prospects for a significant improvement in relations in the foreseeable future are not good, since the longer-term goals of Russia and those of the EU contradict one another. 12 The Russian leadership's commitment to reestablish a dominant position across as much of Eurasia as possible come into direct conflict with the specific EU objectives of stabilizing post-Soviet space in eastern Europe and the more general objectives that have been in place ever since the Second World War of establishing and strengthening, along with the United States, the liberal international order that has been dominant for the past quarter century.
As Russian leaders from Vladimir Putin to Sergei Lavrov have made most clear in recent years, Moscow does not accept the fundamental principles that underlie the current international system and will do whatever it can to undermine that system. Military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, cyber attacks against a range of post-communist states, support for radical nationalist groups in EU member countries, meddling in the electoral processes of democratic states in Europe and North America are all tools that Russia has used in recent years to help to weaken the Western-dominated international system in place since the end of the cold war. 13 The confrontation between Russia and the European Union will continue until one side or the other abandons some of the objectives that have been central to its policy -in effect, to its sense of identity -which is highly unlikely to occur in the near future. 12 The following argument is based on the assumption that the commitment to an integrated Europe that has characterized the EU for the past half century continues to flourish. The author is well aware of the negative implications of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the rise of authoritarian and nationalist political movements across many EU countries for the continued strengthening of integration.
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